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Abstract
Venture capital is an investment made by specialized organizations in high-growth, high-risk and often highly
technological firms that need capital to finance product development or growth. This sort of financing is, by
nature, mostly in the form of equity rather than debt. The purpose of this paper is to identify and ascertain the
effects of the various exogenous variables that influence the supply and demand of venture capital.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Venture capital is an investment made by
specialized organizations in high-growth, high-risk
and often highly technological firms that need capi-
tal to finance product de-
velopment or growth. This
sort of financing is, by na-
ture, mostly in the form of
equity rather than debt.
The capital invested in
such fashion usually origi-
nates from private and
public pension funds, en-
dowment funds, founda-
tions, corporations,
wealthy individuals, and
foreign investors.
The venture capi-
tal market in the U.S. is
known for its vibrancy and
success in fueling the
economy. Some of the big-
gest players in many in-
dustries received their initial impetus from these
venture capital funds. In fact, countries like Japan
and the UK have attempted to model their own ven-
ture capital industries after the United States
(Rodney Clark, 1987). Venture capital is also an
important catalyst in the development, implemen-
tation and commercialization of new technology—
even creating entirely new industries, including bio-
technology and overnight shipping. Some of
America’s most successful companies grew with the
help of venture funding—Intel, DEC, Apple,
Microsoft, Sun Microsystems, FedEx, Genentech,
and Netscape, to name a few. (Venture One)
Venture capital institutions perform another
important role. Their presence as investors in a com-
pany going public can certify that the offering price
of the issue reflects all available and relevant inside
information (Meggison & Weiss, 1997). It there-
fore becomes a matter of great significance that
policies be made to encourage venture capital ac-
tivity in the economy. This
in turn calls for a good un-
derstanding of the various
factors that affect its mar-
ket. The purpose of this
paper is to identify and
ascertain the effects of the
various exogenous vari-
ables that influence the
supply and demand of ven-
ture capital.  Section II
will provide a theoretical
background of the supply
and demand of venture
capital, and the various ex-
ogenous factors that may
affect the market. Section
III builds upon the various
theories and sets up the
empirical model. Section IV analyzes the results of
the statistical tests that are run on the model. Fi-
nally, Section V presents some policy implications
based upon the findings of the study and provides
suggestions for future research.
II.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
A.  The Supply and Demand Model for Venture
Capital
To understand the various mechanisms by
which the different factors influence venture capi-
tal activity, it is important to discuss its quantity
and price under a supply-demand framework.  In
Figure 1, the supply curve represents the willing-
ness of institutions and individuals to supply ven-
ture capital as a function of the rate of return on the
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investment. A higher rate of return leads to a greater
desire to supply capital. Thus, as in most cases, this
is an upward-sloping supply curve. The demand
schedule represents the volume of venture capital
demanded by firms/entrepreneurs at a given ex-
pected rate of return. Here, the rate of return de-
manded by the suppliers of the venture capital in-
vestments is the price of borrowing these funds for
those who demand it. A higher rate of return there-
fore, reduces the number of firms that are willing or
able to borrow capital at that rate, leading to a down-
ward sloping demand curve.
By construction, the point of intersection of
the supply and demand curves represents the equi-
librium price of venture capital. However, returns
from venture capital investments are generally ob-
tained a few years after the initial investment, when
the firm is taken public, or gets bought out. Such
events give the venture investors a chance to exit
from their investments and cash-in on the returns.
Until that event occurs, the firm is valued only at
cost. This measure, however, fails to account for
the intrinsic value of the firm, rendering it useless
as a measure of the anticipated return on venture
capital investments. Gompers and Lerner also point
out that the reporting and accounting practices of
the various venture capital organizations differ con-
siderably, further complicating the task of measur-
ing the anticipated returns on venture investments
(1997).
The important thing to note about the ven-
ture capital industry is that both the suppliers and
the demanders of venture capital are ultimately mo-
tivated by profit. Therefore, the factors that influ-
ence venture capital activity usually do so via their
influence on the expected profit (anticipated rate of
return) from the venture. Given this framework, the
following section discusses the major exogenous
factors that influence these expectations of profit
from venture investments, thus affecting the mar-
ket for venture capital. For each variable, economic
theory is used to predict and estimate the nature of
its effect.
B.  Factors Influencing the Market
1.  Industry and Market Performance
Industry performance has historically
proven to be extremely important in attracting more
participants and capital into any industry. This can
be explained by the basic principle of profit maxi-
mization, which dictates that individuals seek to
participate in economic activities with a motivation
of earning profit. As a result, the industry that ex-
hibits a high probability of profit, ceteris paribus,
generates more interest and attracts more invest-
ment. Accordingly, the performance of the venture
capital industry also has an impact on the supply
and demand of venture capital. Better returns in the
venture industry tend to generate more demand and
attract more supply of venture capital. On the other
hand, poor performance (in terms of returns) de-
presses venture capital activity.1
Another related factor that works in con-
junction with industry performance is the overall
performance of capital markets. This is a direct re-
sult of the fact that most of the aforesaid gains made
on a venture investment come from an initial pub-
lic offering (IPO) and that the success of an IPO, in
turn, is inextricably connected with the health of
the capital markets (Venture Economics, 1988). A
healthy stock market also facilitates the creation of
liquidity in the venture sector, thus encouraging con-
tributions. Black and Gilson also find in their re-
search that growing and robust capital markets posi-
tively effect the venture capital industry.
2.  Capital Gains Tax (CGT)
There has been considerable empirical evi-
dence regarding the effects of capital gains taxes on
venture capital activity. Venture capital activity and
funding rose dramatically after the capital gains tax
cuts of 1978 and 1981. Also, since the capital gains
rate hike in 1986, the rate of venture capital invest-
ing has been rather stable in the U.S.  Meanwhile, it
has increased rapidly in other parts of the world.
This capital gains rate hike, therefore, has in effect
caused negative growth in venture capital funding
in the U.S.  Poterba considers these correlations to
be sufficient to hypothesize a negative relationship
between the capital gains tax rates and the level of
venture capital funding.
According to this hypothesis, the capital
gains tax has a two-sided effect. Changes in capital
gains tax rates alter the expected profits from such
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ventures for both the suppliers and the demanders.
On the one hand, a reduction in the capital gains
tax raises the supply of venture capital by increas-
ing the after tax returns in assets that yield capital
gains, reducing the required rate of pre-tax return.
This causes a right-shift in the supply curve (Figure
1). On the other hand, a reduction in the tax rate
increases the demand for venture capital funds by
increasing the number of individuals that initiate
start-ups, and making it easier for them to attract
employees. In addition, capital gains income can
be made more attractive to those entrepreneurs that
are considering forgoing wage income to engage in
private ventures. Consequently, there is a right-shift
in the demand schedule for venture capital (Figure 1).
It is important to note that differential tax-
treatment of venture investors and entrepreneurs is
possible, since the two classes of people can easily
be distinguished.  Therefore, to formulate tax poli-
cies that are efficient, it is important to analyze the
magnitude of influence that capital gains taxation
has on the suppliers (venture investors) and demand-
ers (entrepreneurs). Only after studying its effects
on the two sub-groups can we formulate policies
that effectively encourage venture capital. This dif-
ferential will also be further analyzed using the em-
pirical model.
3.  Research and Development
As pointed out in the introduction, venture
capital investments are often made in high-growth,
high-risk ventures that are often highly technologi-
cal in nature. Landscroner and Paroush (1995) ex-
plain that venture capital firms play a crucial role
in commercializing new technologies (technologies
that are still in the nascent stages of development).
New technologies tend to open up new markets and
new opportunities for profit, seducing individual and
institutional venture capitalists as well as entrepre-
neurs. In turn, the flow of funds from the suppliers
of venture capital helps fund further research in these
new technologies. This theory, therefore, suggests a
strong positive link between R&D expenditures and
venture capital activity. It is important to also men-
tion that this does not necessarily imply causation
in one way or the other. The relationship between
R&D and venture capital funding appears to be more
symbiotic in nature, where they both mutually ben-
efit from each other.  Moreover, Lerner and Gompers
found that spending on Research and Development
had a significant positive impact on venture capital
activity at the state-level (1998).  According to them,
high R&D expenditures indicate a high number of
“potential entrepreneurs with promising ideas.” The
R&D variable could also potentially capture the
Figure 2: Venture Capital Investments and the Mximum Statutory Long Term Capital Gains
Tax Rate for High-Income Tax Payers
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demand effects of high-technology firms. It would
therefore be reasonable to hypothesize that increased
R&D spending creates a similar effect at the aggre-
gate level.
4.  Interest Rates
Basic macroeconomic theory suggests that
debt instruments are an alternative to equity invest-
ments, which includes venture capital investments.
Thus, if interest rates (returns on credit given) rise,
the relative attractiveness of investing in venture
capital funds would likely deteriorate, ceteris pari-
bus. This would decrease the willingness of inves-
tors to supply venture capital at all prices, i.e., all
expected return levels. Since the decision to invest
is generally based upon past performance of the
various alternatives, the previous year’s perfor-
mance of interest rate will be used as a comparative
standard. In other words, the interest rates variable
will be lagged.  These are the major factors that are
predicted to affect the supply and demand for ven-
ture capital in the US. In the following section, we
will discuss the various proxies that are used in the
model to account for these factors.
III.  EMPIRICAL MODEL
The data set for the empirical model con-
sists of a time series. The model is set up as an OLS
model in which the dependent variable measures
venture capital activity. The explanatory variables
include proxies to capture the effects of the various
factors discussed in the previous section. Following
is a list of variables used in the model.
A.Venture Capital Commitments
(VC_COMMIT)
This is the dependent variable in the model
and is used as a proxy for the venture capital activ-
ity in the U.S. in a given year. It measures the total
amount of commitments made by the venture capi-
tal industry in a given year.  The commitments made
in a given year usually span across many years.  For
instance, a venture capitalist might commit to pro-
viding a venture with $10 million over the next four
years, although the actual funds defrayed may only
be $2.5 million in the first year, $3 million in the
second year, and so on.  Tracking actual venture
capital payments made in a given year would there-
fore reflect past commitments.  Instead, the com-
mitments made in a given year more accurately re-
flect the sentiments of the investors and the market
for venture capital. Therefore, it is a reasonable
measure of venture capital activity in a given year.
The data was obtained from the Venture Econom-
ics database and various issues of the Venture Capi-
tal Journal.
B. Industry and Market Performance
(IND_PERF)
To measure the effect of industry perfor-
mance, some type of a handle on returns on venture
capital investments is needed.  Unfortunately, as
pointed out before, estimating the price of venture
capital is difficult, given the long-term nature of its
payoffs.  As a proxy, the model uses the amount of
money raised by the IPOs of venture capital-backed
firms in a certain year. Based on the theory described
in Section II.B.1, the predicted effect of this vari-
able on VC_COMMIT should be positive.  This
measure is a suitable proxy for the performance of
(returns on) venture capital investments because the
bulk of the profits on a venture investment are made
by taking the firm public (Venture Economics,
1988).  Almost 96% of the IPOs and only 59% of
the acquisitions provided positive returns on invest-
ments for the venture capitalists (Venture Capital
Journal2).
A separate Venture Economics study done
in 1998 found that $1.00 invested in a firm that
goes public provides an average cash return of $1.95
over the initial investment with an average holding
period of 4.2 years.  Compare this with the next
best option, which is the acquisition of the firm that
the money was invested in.  In this case, the return
is only 40 cents over a mean holding period of 3.7
years.  This proxy also captures the effects of the
performance of the markets in general because the
valuation and pricing of an IPO is strongly corre-
lated with the prevalent market conditions (Gompers
and Lerner, 1999).  The data was obtained from
The Venture Capital Cycle (Gompers and Lerner,
1999).
C.  Capital Gains Tax Rate (CAP_GAINS)
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This was measured using the Maximum
Statutory Long term Capital Gains Tax Rate for
high-income tax payers as determined by the Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS).  As the theory suggests,
this variable can be expected to have a negative re-
lationship with VC_COMMIT.  The data was ob-
tained from the IRS database.
D.  Research and Development Spending (R&D)
The proxy used to measure the influence of
Research and Development is national expenditures
for R&D as a percentage of gross domestic product
(GDP), as reported by the National Science Foun-
dation (NSF).  The advantage of using this variable
is that it provides a built-in control for the overall
economic situation by incorporating GDP in its cal-
culation.  This variable is expected to have a posi-
tive relationship with venture capital commitments
because of the reasons described in Section II.B.3.
The data was computed using data obtained from
the NSF homepage.
E.  Interest Rates (INT_RATE)
The lagged 30 year T-bill Constant Maturity Rate
is used as a proxy to measure the prevalent interest
rates in the financial market. A negative relation-
ship is suggested between this variable and
VC_COMMIT by the theory discussed in Section
II.B.4. The data was obtained from the Economagic
database.  Table 1 summarizes the information on
the different variables.
The OLS model is set up as follows:
VC_COMMIT = a + ß1IND_PERF +
ß2CAP_GAINS + ß3R&D + ß4INT_RATE + ý
IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
Data from 1978 to 1995 was used in the
model described in Section III.  Table 2 shows the
results obtained.  The adjusted R2 was 65.11% and
all the variables had the predicted signs. In terms of
significance, two of the four variables were signifi-
cant at the 95% level of confidence.  These vari-
ables were CAP_GAINS and INT_RATE.
A second regression was run with the R&D
variable lagged.  This was done with the reasoning
that the spending done on R&D in a given year is
more likely to influence venture capital demand and
supply in the following year(s).  The results are
shown in Table 3.
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Table 1: Summary Description of Variables
Used in OLS Model
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Table 2: Regression Results
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Table 3: Regression Results (R&D lagged)
Table 4: Comparison of the Beta values of CAP_GAINS
on Taxable and Non-Taxable Commitments
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Although one observation was lost in the
process, IND_PERF (industry and market perfor-
mance) became significant at the 90% level of con-
fidence.  R&D also gained some significance.  The
signs remained as predicted for all the variables.
The next regressions slightly modify the
original model to further analyze the effects of capi-
tal gains tax on venture capital in light of its differ-
ential tax-treatment mentioned in Section B.2.  A
log-lin model was used instead of the standard OLS
test to study the taxable commitments (commitments
by individuals) and non-taxable commitments (com-
mitments by pension funds).  The equations are as
follows:
ln(TAXABLE) = a + ß1IND_PERF +
ß2CAP_GAINS + ß3R&D + ß4INT_RATE +  ý
   ln(NONTAXABLE) = a + ß1IND_PERF +
ß2CAP_GAINS + ß3R&D + ß4INT_RATE +  ý
The log-lin model was used so that the re-
sults could be standardized across the two sub-
groups of investors.  With this model, the coeffi-
cients can be interpreted as relative changes in com-
mitments due to an absolute change the explana-
tory variables.
If capital gains taxation has a stronger ef-
fect on the suppliers, then CAP_GAINS would be
expected to have a significantly stronger negative
impact on capital commitments from taxable inves-
tors.  If the opposite hypothesis is true, that is the
effect is stronger for the demanders, then the effect
of CAP_GAINS should be more-or-less uniform
across both the sub-groups, since the reduction in
supply would then be a result of falling demand.
The following coefficients were obtained for
CAP_GAINS.
As shown in Table 4, the effect of capital
gains tax rates is more-or-less similar across the two
sub-groups of investors. For every percentage point
increase in the capital gains tax rate, the taxable
commitments go down by approximately 16%, and
the non-taxable commitments go down by roughly
13%3. These results suggest that the demand side
theory is correct and that the entrepreneurs (demand-
ers of venture capital) are more sensitive to changes
in the capital gains tax rate.
V.  CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this research was to assist in
formulating policies that encourage venture capi-
tal.  It is clear from the results that capital gains
taxes have a negative impact on venture capital ac-
tivity.  A reduction in the capital gains tax rates
would therefore boost the inflow of funds into the
industry.  In addition, this study found that the de-
mand-side effect of capital gains taxes is stronger
than the supply-side effect.  Therefore, special at-
tention should be paid to subsidize the entrepreneurs
(the demanders of venture capital).  Poterba’s ca-
veat should, however, be kept in mind.  Most of the
capital gains taxes collected by the government are
not from capital appreciation resulting from ven-
ture investment or entrepreneurship.  In fact, ven-
ture capital activity generates a rather small per-
centage of these capital gains. An across-the-board
cut would unfairly benefit the owners of the major
chunk of capital gains income that exists outside
the venture capital industry.  Special tax subsidies
that target the industry would likely resolve the is-
sue.
Although R&D spending did not prove to
be too significant, it did have the expected sign.
Also, its p-value went up from 0.45 in the first re-
gression (Table 3) to 0.27 in the second (Table 4).
The variable also was significant in the state-wide
analysis done by Lerner and Gompers. Thus, the
variable shows a lot of promise.  It would therefore
be reasonable to suggest increased R&D spending
as a means of increasing venture capital activity,
although further research in this area is still war-
ranted.
In terms of future research on the topic, there are a
number of aspects of this study that can be refined.
The biggest challenge will be the collection of
enough data to derive meaningful results from the
tests.  Increasing the number of observations will
significantly improve the reliability of the findings.
Also, a better measure for industry performance can
be used.  One possible proxy would be a running
average of the performance of the stocks of the com-
panies that were taken public.  This proxy might be
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better at capturing the long-term returns on venture
investments than simply the IPO market price of
these stocks.
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